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even further limited in the exercise of its discretionary powers with regard to settle-
ment negotiations. It is conceded that this decision will prove favorable in further
discouraging the small minority of unscrupulous or heedless insurance companies
from selfishly ignoring the interests of their policyholders. But it will also place
an additional contractual duty upon the shoulders of all automobile insurance
companies, a duty nowhere indicated, either expressly or inpliedly, in the written
policy.
John J. Patridge
CONTRACTS: REcoVERY ON A CONTINGENT FEE CONTRACT BY AN ATTORNEY
IN DEFAULT
There is considerable confusion in the law concerning recovery by one who
breaches a contract for his personal services. This problem, complicated by the
question of divisibility of a contingent fee contract, was raised in the California
case of Moore v. Fellner.1
Moore was employed on a contingent fee basis to prosecute an action by
Fellner against one Steinbaum for damages arising from breach of contract.
For the same fee he was to defend Fellner in an action brought against him
by one Berzon for a broker's commission arising out of the same transaction.
Moore's compensation was to have been twenty percent of any amount recovered
from Steinbaum if settled before trial or twenty-five percent if the action should
proceed to trial, plus costs. The final paragraph of their contract read as follows:
"It is understood that this agreement covers our understanding to the conclusion
of these two cases in the Superior Court and, at our option, in any of the higher
courts." The two actions were consolidated for trial and resulted in a judgment
of $104,500 for Felner against Steinbaum and a judgment of $20,000 against
Fellner for Berzon which was settled for $17,500. Steinbaum filed notice of
appeal.2
Having done all the necessary work to that time in connection with the appeal,
but before the appeal was taken, Moore wrote Fellner offering to defend him in
the higher court for a fee of $2,000 plus costs. Feilner's answer referred to the
terms of the contract by which Moore was required "at our [Fellner's] option"
to defend an appeal. Moore repeated his offer demanding the additional fee for
his further services. Felner discharged him and sought new counsel. Moore
refused to sign the substitution of attorney papers and Fellner was forced to
secure the substitution by order of the court. Upon receipt of notice of the order,
Moore wrote that, since Felner had by this action prevented him from performing
his part of "any agreement that we had regarding your representation in that
case," he was rescinding the contract and would commence action to determine
the reasonable value of services rendered to that date.
The trial court found that Moore's demand for additional fees constituted
a breach of contract and that Moore was discharged for cause by Fellner. It also
found that Moore had rescinded his agreement with Fellner. That at the time
of his discharge Moore had "substantially performed" his agreement, and that
the services rendered by him were of value to Fellner. Inconsistencies in the
I50 Cal.2d ....... 325 P.2d 857 (1958).
2 Fellner v. Steinbaum, 132 Cal. App. 2d 509, 282 P.2d 584 (1955).
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trial court's findings make it difficult to determine with certainty the basis upon
which recovery was allowed. The court seems to have relied on rescission and
restitution in awarding Moore reasonable value for his services.
From a judgment for $12,825 in Moore's favor, both plaintiff and defendant
appealed. Plaintiff contended that the award was inadequate. Defendant, claim-
ing breach of contract by plaintiff, urged that judgment should have been in
his favor.
The Supreme Court of California held that the contract had been breached
by Moore's unjustified demand for additional fees. That the words "and, at our
option, in any of the higher courts" inserted into the contract by the client were
intended to reserve to him the right to dismiss the attorneys and obtain other
counsel on any appeal. Thus the contract was divisible into services contemplated
in the superior court and services contemplated in any of the higher courts.
Since the contract was divisible, the court held that the attorney could recover
the value of the benefit he conferred upon Fellner less any damages caused by his
breach. The value of the services actually rendered was based on the contract price
and damages were the cost to Fellner of obtaining other representation in the
appeal.
There are three distinct approaches applicable in deciding whether a plaintiff
in default should recover.
Under the traditional theory a breaching party on an entire contract for
personal services will be denied recovery.3 In order to allow recovery, the court
must find the contract of employment divisible. Even then recovery is limited
to those divisible parts of the contract fully performed at the time of the breach.4
The second approach will deny recovery where the breach is intentional,
deliberate or wilful. 5 The difficulty here is in determining what constitutes such
a breach.6 An intentional, deliberate or wilful breach entitling the other party
to a discharge of his obligation under the contract is accomplished by an act
which is in fact inconsistent with an intent to be further bound by the terms
of the contract.7 It is to be distinguished from an act done inadvertantly or
under a mistaken notion as to the actor's rights under the contract.8
The third approach is based on the rule in Britton v. Turner.9 This case
represents the strong minority position that, regardless of the defaulting party's
conduct, he is entitled to the reasonable value of the benefit conferred upon
the other party less any damage caused by his default. 10
s Cahill v. Baird, 7 Cal. Unrep. 61, 70 Pac. 1061 (1902); 4 WI.IsToN, CONTRACTS § 1028,
S Id. § 1477 (rev. ed. 1938).
4 Hartman v. Rogers, 69 Cal. 643, 11 Pac. 581 (1886).
5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1473 (rev. ed. 1938) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 357 (1) (a),
comment le (1932) ; RESTATEmENT, AGENCY §456 (b), comment c (1933).
6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1123 (1950).
7 Worthington v. Given, 119 Ala. 44, 24 So. 739 (1898).
8 This seems to have been the position of the District Court of Appeals in reversing the
trial court and finding for the defendant, Fellner. The court found that Moore had by his
conduct discharged himself under the contract, that Fellner's notice of discharge was a mere
formality, and that Moore's notice of rescission was ineffective for any purpose. Presiding
justice Shinn, writing the opinion of the court, said:
"This is not merely a case where an attorney has been discharged for cause, . . . It is
a simple case of breach of contract by the attorney2'
Moore v. Fellner, 155 A.C.A. 742, 318 P.2d 526 (1957).
9 6 N.H. 481 (1834).
10 5 CORBN, CONTRACTS § 1127, at 565 and cases cited n. 36 (1951).
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In the Moore case the Supreme Court stated obiter that an attorney who
wrongfully abandons or withdraws from a case or is discharged for cause by
the client may not recover compensation where the contract of employment is
entire, 1 aligning California with the traditional view. However, the court found
the contract divisible and allowed Moore to recover the reasonable value of the
benefit conferred on his client. This finding of divisibility of a contingent fee
contract is highly questionable.
An entire contract does not by its terms, express or implied, contemplate
or admit of apportionment upon partial failure.' 2 A contract in which all parts
are intended to be interdependent is entire.13 To find a contract divisible it is
essential not only that a part be calculable, but that there be an express or
implied promise to pay for that part.14 Tested by these statements a contingent
fee contract is clearly an entire contract.
Further, recovery based on reasonable value is inconsistent with a finding
of divisibility. Under a truly divisible contract a defaulting plaintiff need only
show performance of the divisible portion in order to recover. In such a case
recovery can be had on the contract for any fully performed divisible part
with no necessity for proving reasonable value or benefit to the defendant. 15
Indeed, an attorney may not arbitrarily renounce a contract and claim instead
the reasonable value of his services.' 6 Even a contract contemplating alternate
percentages of the recovery depending upon the settlement of a matter without
going to court, settlement after trial, or settlement after appeals is not divisible.
A favorable judgment in a trial court which is ultimately reversed on appeal
will not earn the attorney any fee for his services in the trial court. Nor will
success in the trial court followed by successful defense of an appeal earn two
fees.17 Such a contract should be construed as being three separate entire con-
tracts based on alternate contingencies, the operation of one necessarily pre-
cluding the other two.
The Supreme Court held in the Moore case that the words "and, at our option,
in any of the higher courts" inserted into the contract by the client created a
contract divisible for the benefit of the client in reserving to him the right to
change counsel on an appeal. It then reasoned that a contract divisible for the
benefit of one party is also divisible for the benefit of the other party. However,
since a client has the right to' change counsel at any time,' 8 it seems at least as
reasonable to construe the words as intended to protect the client by assuring
him the services of counsel in case he should wish to carry an appeal from an
11Cahill v. Baird, 7 Cal. Unrep. 61, 70 Pac. 1061 (1902), reV'd on other grounds, 138
Cal. 691, 72 Pac. 342 (1903) ; 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 169(a) (3) (1952) ; WooD, FEE
CoNmcrTS or LAWYERS §§ 68, 70 (1936). See In re Badger, 9 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1925). Accord,
RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTS § 270 (1932); RESTATEmENxT, AGENCY §§ 445, 456, 469 (1933).
But see Salopek v. Shoemann, 20 Cal. App. 2d 150, 124 P.2d 21 (1942).
1
2 fBrockett v. Pipkin, 25 Tenn. App. 1, 149 S.W.2d 478 (1941).
13 Palmer v. Fix, 104 Cal. App. 562, 286 Pac. 498 (1930).
14 3 WILLISToN, CoNT AcTs § 861 (rev. ed. 1938).
15 5 CoRBIN, CONTaCtS § 1127, at 570 (1950) ; see also 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1028,
at 2868 (rev. ed. 1938).
166 CAL.JuR.2d Attorneys at Law § 188 (1952).
17 Jackson v. Campbell, 215 Cal. 103, 8 P.2d 845 (1932).
18 6 CAL. JuR. 2d Attorneys at Law § 172 (1952).
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